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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SOCIAL CLUBS AS PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS:
EXPRESSIVE AND INTIMATE ASSOCIATION V.
STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION*
New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York,
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988)
Appellant sued appellee to enjoin it from enforcing Local Law 63
("Law 63"),' alleging that its anti-discrimination provision2 unconstitutionally infringed on appellant clubs' right to associate. 3 Law 63 applied
the anti-discrimination provision of New York City's Human Rights
Law' to any entity that registered over 400 members, provided regular
meal service, and received service fees from nonmembers. 5 Clubs possessing these characteristics resembled public accommodations and
thus forfeited the "distinctly private" exemption of Law 63.6 On cross

*EditrsNote: This paper received the George W. Milain Outstanding Case Comment Award
for Fall 1988.
1. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). Appellant,
New York State Club Association (NYSCA), sought a declaration of Local Law 63's unconstitutionality and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. Id. at 2231. NYSCA is a non-profit
organization composed of over one hundred social, golf, tennis, and yacht clubs. See generally,
James, Do Private Clubs Have a Right to Exclude?, 9 PREVIEW 253 (f988).

2. Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 14-15. Local Law 63 lists characteristics of clubs
that are subject to the anti-discrimination provision because they are not "distinctly private."
See infra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
3. Appellant alleged that Local Law 63 violated members' first amendment rights to freedom
of association and the penumbral right of privacy. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at
2231. Appellant also alleged that the Law's exempting benevolent and religious corporations
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. Recently, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously held that religious corporations may be exempted from the
employment discrimination prohibitions of § 702 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act without violating
the establishment clause or the equal protection clause. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2868-70 (1987).
4. The New York City Human Rights Law prohibited discrimination by any "place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement." Local Law No. 97 of 1965. The Law defined the term
to include a variety of commercial establishments and specific institutions, such as hospitals and
parks. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986). But the Law exempted "distinctly private" institutions from its application. Id. In its original form, the New York City Human Rights Law
provided no definition of "distinctly private."
5. Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 14-15. This Law provides that a club shall not be
considered distinctly private if it "has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal
service and regularly receives payment... from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance
of trade or business." Id.
6. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. at 2230.
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motions for summary judgment, the New York Supreme Court declared Law 63 constitutional. 7 Both the Appellate Division and the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed,8 reasoning that the clubs affected by Law 63 lacked the characteristics of expressive and intimate

associations that the Constitution protected.9 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of Appeal's judgment and
HELD Law 63 was facially constitutionallo because it did not significantly infringe on the appellant clubs' protected associations.",
The Supreme Court has recognized at least two types of constitutionally protected interpersonal associations: expressive association
and intimate association.12 While the Constitution does not expressly
guarantee the rights of expressive and intimate association, the Court
3
has held that certain constitutional provisions imply these freedoms.'
The right of expressive association embraces the individual's right to
associate when engaged in activity protected by the first amendment.14
In addition, the right to privacy protects an individual's intimate per5
sonal and familial associations.'

7.

Id. at 2231.

8. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S. 2d
152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), affid, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987).
The intermediate state appellate court affirmed the trial court, but one judge dissented on the
equal protection issue. New York State Club Ass'n, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). See also supra note 3 (discussing appellant's allegations that the Law
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment). The New York Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the intermediate state appellate court. New York State Club
Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349.
9. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2231. The New York Court of Appeals specified
that any infringement upon associational rights was justified by the city's compelling interest
in eliminating discrimination against women and minorities. Id.
10. Id.
11.

Id.

12. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Associational rights proceed on a continuum from the least
protected, i.e., economic associations, to the most protected forms of association, i.e., association
for socio-political, religious, or intimate personal reasons. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.41 (3d ed. 1986).
13. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
14. See James, supra note 1, at 254.
15. See id. The Supreme Court has specified that the right to privacy protects the individual's ability to engage in intensely personal activities, decisions, and relationships free from
government intrusion. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 479 (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
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The Court first formally recognized the implied constitutional right16
of expressive association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.
In NAACP, plaintiff sued to enjoin the NAACP from operating in
Alabama.' 7 The NAACP denied plaintiff access to the NAACP's membership records contending that the court could not constitutionally
compel disclosure. 8 When the NAACP refused to honor the discovery
request, the court held it in contempt.19 However, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the plaintiff could not constitutionally compel
the NAACP to reveal its membership roster.20 According to the Court,
the Constitution protected the NAACP's nondisclosure interest because it directly related to the members' right to associate in pursuit
of their lawful interest. 21 The Court thus found that the first amendment impliedly guaranteed the right to associate for expressive activity.22
Most importantly, the NAACP Court recognized the nexus between the freedoms of speech and association: group association enhanced the NAACP's ability to advocate its views.2 Compelling the
NAACP to disclose its membership lists would have unconstitutionally
burdened its expressive association, especially in light of already exist24
ing threats of economic and physical harm against NAACP members.
Therefore, allowing discovery of members' names and addresses would

16. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court referred to a constitutional right of expressive association
before officially recognizing its existence. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50
(1957).

17. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 452. The plaintiff sought to prove that the NAACP was subject
to an Alabama statute requiring a foreign corporation to file a corporate charter and designate
a place of business and an agent for service of process before doing business in the state. Id.
at 451. The NAACP considered itself exempt from the statute. Id. at 453. Discovery of the
NAACP's records, the plaintiff asserted, was necessary to prove that the organization engaged
in intrastate business and was therefore subject to the qualification statute. Id. at 451-53.

18. Id. at 453-54.
19.

Id. at 453.

20. Id. at 466. The Court stated that "freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of...

the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .

embraces freedom of speech." Id. at 460.
21. Id. at 462-63. The Court, however, has construed freedom of association to allow the
punishing of illegal acts committed in pursuance of lawful expressive interests. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (holding that associational rights under
the first and fourteenth amendments do not prevent the punishing of violent acts committed

during a constitutionally protected boycott of racially discriminatory merchants).
22.

NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-63.

23. Id. at 460. Thus, "[elffective advocacy of both public and private points of view...
is undeniably enhanced by group association ... ." Id.
24. Id. at 462.
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have hindered the NAACP's associative goal - advancing the social
welfare of blacks.? The Court found the state interest in obtaining
the membership records insufficient to justify the damage that compelled disclosure would cause the NAACP's protected associational
rights.2
As was true regarding expressive association, 27 the Court embraced
a general right to privacy years before it formally articulated its
parameters.2 Although the concept of intimate association had long
been a part of American jurisprudence,2 the Court did not set forth
a specific constitutional guarantee of privacy until Griswold v. Connec-

25. Id. at 463. The Court feared that compelled disclosure of members' identities would
inhibit NAACP members from fostering their beliefs, induce members to withdraw from the
NAACP, and dissuade potential members from joining the organization. Id.
26. Id. at 463-65.
27. See supra note 16.
28. An 1890 Warren & Brandeis article discussed the individual's right to privacy. See infra
note 29. In the 1923 Meyer decision, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that prohibited
all grade schools from teaching any subject in any language other than English. Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). The Court reasoned that the statute unreasonably infringed
upon individual liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 399. The Court stated that while it had "not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed" the due process clause "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual . . . to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, . . . and . . . to enjoy those privileges . . . essential to the orderly

pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. The statute interfered with the calling of teachers, the
opportunities of pupils, and the power of parents to control their children's education. Id. at
401. Two years later, the Court followed the Meyer doctrine and invalidated a statute that
required parents and guardians to send children to public rather than to private schools. Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). The Court took its next major step in defining
the scope of what is now called the right to privacy in the 1942 Skinner decision. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Skinner Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a
statute permitting the state to sterilize repeat felons. Id. at 541. The Skinner Court specified
that the individual has a constitutionally protected fundamental interest in matters of procreation.
Id. While none of these decisions mentioned a right to privacy, Meyer, Pierce, and Skinner
established that the individual's interest in matters of family and procreation deserve specialized
constitutional protection. Twenty years after Skinner, the Court faced a challenge to a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Although the Poe majority held that the challenge failed to present a justiciable controversy,
Justice Harlan's dissent delineated that the due process clause protects marital "privacy" from
government interference. Id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Scholars have agreed that an article written by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
gave birth to the constitutional right to privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). In their article, Warren and Brandeis advocated the protection
of each person's private life from intrusions by newspapers, and thereby introduced the concept
of the legal right to privacy. Id.
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ticut.30 In Griswold, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute3 ' that
restricted married persons' right to use contraceptives. 2 Describing
the right to privacy, the Court stated that specific Bill of Rights
guarantees emanated fundamental notions of liberty and protected
intimate spousal and familial relationships." Since Griswold, the Court
has refused to extend this specialized constitutional protection to some
close personal relationships outside this core.'The Supreme Court recognized that assertedly private clubs contained elements of both expressive and intimate association in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees." Nevertheless, the Roberts Court held that
the state violated neither associative freedom by subjecting the
Jaycees to an anti-discrimination statute 36 because the Jaycees was
not a private club for first amendment purposes.' 7 Therefore, the
Jaycees could reap no benefit from the statutory private club exemption." To exclude the Jaycees from the ambit of the exemption, the
Court reasoned that the members' relationship lacked the characteristics of a protected intimate association.' 9 Specifically, Jaycees chapters
lacked relative smaliness, 40 selectivity in memberhip, 41 and seclusion

30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958). The Griswold Court invalidated the same
statute that was at issue in Poe v. Ullman. Poe, 367 U.S. 497. See also supra note 28 (discussing
the Poe decision).
32. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
33. Id. at 484.
34. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-95 (1986) (holding that consensual homosexual conduct by adults was not protected by the right to privacy). Compare Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (holding that extended families had the right to live
together and invalidating zoning laws that had prevented some extended family living arrangements) with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding a local ordinance
that prevented unrelated persons from sharing a residence). But see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 447-54 (1972) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a statute prohibiting distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
35. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). Roberts illustrated that expressive and intimate associational
rights may overlap and defy easy categorization. Id.
36. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982) states, in pertinent part that 'Itis an unfair discrimi[t]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
natory practice ...
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because
of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or sex." Id.
37. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621. The Court also rejected the argument that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 629.
38. Id. at 620.
39. Id. at 621.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Court noted that apart from age and sex, neither the U.S. Jaycees nor local
chapters employed any specific criteria for membership. Id. In fact, the Jaycees recruited and
welcomed new members without inquiry into their backgrounds. Id.
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from outsiders in activity central to the relationship.4 Instead, the
Jaycees association more closely resembled a public accommodation
or business enterprise than an intimate, protected family or truly
private club.43

Furthermore, freedom of expressive association did not protect the
Jaycees' gender-discriminatory membership selection practices.A Two
distinctions were crucial to the Court's reasoning. First, the Court
adopted a functional definition of "public accommodation," 45recognizing
that activity within Jaycees groups provided its members with advantageous business contacts. 46 Subjecting the Jaycees to the anti-discrimination act necessarily furthered the compelling state interest of removing obstacles to the economic and social advancement of women. 47
Second, the state's opening Jaycees' membership to women would not
restrict the organization's ability to exclude persons with ideologies

inconsistent with those of the Jaycees.

Overall, protecting expressive

42. Id. The Jaycees regularly involved nonmembers in the organization's primary activities.
Id. In fact, women functioned as associate members. Id. at 613. As associates, women could
not vote, hold office, or participate in leadership training programs. Id. at 621.
43. Id. at 620. Therefore, the Jaycees association "seem[ed] remote from the concerns giving
rise to" the constitutional protection afforded intimate relationships. Id.
44. Id. at 628-29. The Court has recognized that the freedom of expressive association
implies a correlative right not to associate. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 233 (1977) (holding that non-union teachers had to pay fees equal to the portion of union
dues used to finance collective bargaining, but non-union teachers had a first amendment right
not to finance political activities engaged in by the union). However, the Court has refused to
allow the freedom of association to be used to shield invidious discrimination. See, e.g., Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (refusing to allow the right of association as a defense
to a suit in which the plaintiff alleged gender discrimination in the defendant's process for
promoting associate lawyers to partners); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1973)
(holding unconstitutional state action whereby racially discriminatory private schools enjoyed
substantial state financial aid) ("Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form
of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.").
45. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
46. Id. at 626.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 627. 'There is ... no basis ... for concluding that admission of women as full
voting members will impede the organization's ability to engage in... protected activities or
to disseminate its preferred views." Id. The Court rejected the Jaycees' argument that women
voting members would cause a change in the Jaycees' philosophical tenets. Id. At this point in
its opinion, the Court reiterated its intolerance of unsupported stereotypes as a theoretical basis
of classifying individuals. Id. at 628. See, e.g., Paimore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984)
('The Constitution cannot control ...
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them."); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976) (invalidating a law premised upon the stereotype perception
that teenage males were more likely to become drunk drivers than were teenage females). But
see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1974) (upholding Florida statute allowing widows a
property tax exemption, reasoning that widows were more susceptible than widowers to financial
difficulties).
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association remained the Roberts Court's paramount concern. The compelling state interest in eradicating gender discrimination prevailed
only because the statute achieved it without significantly abridging
49
the Jaycees' freedom of association.
The Court unanimously applied the indeterminate Roberts "public
accommodation" test in Board of Directorsof Rotary Internationalv.
Rotary Club of Duarte.0 In Rotary, the Court upheld a California
statute that required Rotary clubs to admit women. 1 According to
the California statute, "business establishment" transcended fixed corporate headquarters and included any organization that provided business advantages to its members.52 As in Roberts, the Rotary Court
recognized the state's compelling interest in providing women with
equal access to business contacts.r In upholding the statute, the Court
willingly accepted a broad definition of "public accommodation" or
"business establishment" and, consequently, narrowed the private club
exemption.54
In the instant case, the Supreme Court not only adhered to the
Roberts rationale but also unanimously accepted New York City's
three-pronged definition of "private club" for purposes of constitutional
protection. 5 Law 63 defined "public accommodations" as clubs that
have over 400 members, provide regular meal service, and receive
service fees from nonmembers.5 The Court reasoned that clubs possessing these characteristics were not distinctly private in terms of
Roberts criteria.6 Nevertheless, the Constitution might still protect
certain clubs despite the presence of the three characteristics listed
in Law 63.5 The appellant argued that Law 63 created an irrebuttable
presumption: it denied any club defined as a public accommodation

49. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
50. 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
51. Id. at 1946, 48. The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in pertinent part that "[all
persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex,
race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV.

CODE

§ 51 (1982).

52. 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
53. Id. at 1944.
54. Id. at 1948. The term "business establishment" as used in the California statute is
functionally synonymous with "public accommodation." See supra note 51.
55. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988). Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2237. Justice Scalia filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 2238. See infra note 73.
56. Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, app. 14-15. See also supra note 5.
57. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
58. Id. at 2234.
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under the three-pronged test the opportunity to prove that it was
distinctly private9 The Court rejected this facial attack and concluded
that truly private clubs could challenge Law 63 as it applied to them6 0
Addressing the argument that Law 63 infringed on club members'
rights of association,61 the Court found that its objective criteria respected these freedoms. The Court reasoned that Law 63 defined
the objective characteristics of a nonprivate association commensurately with the Roberts criteria.6 For example, clubs that provided
meal service also created the setting where professionally advantageous "networking" occurred.6 Therefore, Law 63 directly furthered
the state's interest in abolishing discrimination against women and
minorities in the business world. 65 Although club members might spend
considerable amounts of time intimately associating,r6 that alone would
not afford basically nonprivate clubs constitutional immunity to practice discrimination.67
Despite the close nexus between speech and expressive association,r8 the Court found that the Constitution did not protect appellant's
discriminatory membership selection Law 63 allowed individuals to
form associations to advocate public or private viewpoints. 70 It did not
require clubs to forego first amendment activities.71 Nor did Law 63
facially preclude a club from excluding individuals whose ideologies
clashed with the club's.72
59. Id. at 2235.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2233-34.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2233.
64. Id. "Networking" in this context is used to mean a system of business contacts.
65. Id. at 2230. The Court explained that the legislature intended to draft Local Law 63
to combat the specific problem that confronted minorities and women in New York City's
business world. Id. The city also extended its Human Rights Law's coverage to discrimination
against persons who are mentally or physically handicapped and to homosexuals. Id. at 2229 n.1.
66. Id. at 2233-34.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2234.
69. Id.
70. Id. The record contained no evidence that any of the appellant clubs united to express
public or private viewpoints. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Court emphasized that although some clubs within the Law's reach may have
been truly private, the Law was not overbroad and invalid on its face. Id. The Court explained
that the overbreadth doctrine is "'strong medicine"' and therefore may be used to declare a
law facially invalid only if the law is "'substantially overbroad'." Id. (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)). Because the appellant failed to identify any clubs whose
associative freedoms would be impaired by the Law, the Court rejected the appellant's overbreadth challenge. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss5/5

8

Pavchinksi: Constitutional Law: Social Clubs as Public Accommodations: Expres
CASE COMMENTS

Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that the Court's decision respected constitutionally protected freedoms of association. Law
63 balanced the state's interest in ensuring nondiscriminatory access
to business opportunities against an association's constitutional right
to choose its membership. 74 The strength of this right, Justice O'Connor added, varies with the expressive nature of the organization2r
Furthermore, she recognized that Law 63 provided procedural
mechanisms that allowed constitutionally protected clubs to challenge
Law 63 as it applied to them.76 Justice O'Connor asserted that the
factors listed in Law 63 were not exclusive, but that courts should
also consider other factors such as purpose, selectivity, and congeniality. 77 Accordingly, once a club showed that it was intimate or expres7
sive in nature, courts would have to respect its associational rights. s
73. Id. at 2237. Justice Kennedy joined in Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id. Justice Scalia
concurred separately. Id. at 2238. While Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's result, he noted
that benevolent and religious organizations could be exempted from Local Law 63 because such
organizations usually did not contribute to the discrimination problem that the Law sought to
eradicate. Id. However, he asserted that for purposes of equal protection analysis, characterizing
benevolent and religious organizations merely as "unique" failed to establish a rational basis for
their exemption. Id. See also supra note 3 (discussing the instant appellant's allegation that
Local Law 63's exempting benevolent and religious organizations violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
74. Id. at 2237.
75. Id. At this point in her opinion, Justice O'Connor referred to the rationale of her Roberts
concurrence. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984). In Roberts, Justice
O'Connor approached the issue of associational freedoms by determining whether a club's activities were "predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 635. A
commercial expressive association would enjoy "only minimal constitutional protection" of its
membership selection practices. Id. An association primarily engaged in protected expression,
however, would enjoy protection "of both the content of its message and the choice of its
members." Id. at 633.
76. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2237. Clubs within the Law's reach could
raise constitutional claims in the administrative proceedings through which the state applied
the Law. Id. The majority noted that clubs unsuccessful in proving the constitutionally protected
nature of their association could challenge the decision reached at the administrative proceeding
on appeal to the judiciary. Id. at 2235.
77. Id. This was the interpretation of the Law suggested by the New York Court of
Appeals. Id. By calling attention to this interpretation of Law 63, Justice O'Connor emphasized
that courts are to stringently review any laws that may abridge freedoms of intimate and
expressive association. Id.
78. Id. at 2237.
For example, . . . a club with over 400 members may still be relatively intimate
in nature, so that a constitutional right to control membership takes precedence.
Similarly, there may well be organizations whose expressive purposes would be
substantially undermined if they were unable to confine their membership to those
of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic background, or who share other such
common bond.
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As in Roberts and Rotary, the instant decision turned on the state's
characterizing the clubs subject to its anti-discrimination law as "public
accommodations" 79 rather than private clubs exempt from state regulation. The instant Court, however, accepted a broader view of the
types of clubs that qualified as "public accommodations." The organizations subject to the desegregation laws in Roberts and Rotary exhibited blatant ties to the business community. The Jaycees designed
leadership training to accelerate its members' business advancement.1
The Rotary classified its membership so that its chapters included
representatives of every worthy business activity in the community81
In contrast, Law 63 applied to social clubs, including golf, tennis,
and yacht clubsA2 The instant Court recognized that some social clubs
serve as quasi-commercial institutions by providing the setting for
businessmen's lunches and other professional contacts. 3 Therefore,
Law 63 specifically served to abolish discrimination not only outside
corporate headquarters, but inside social clubs with understated business ties. 4
The instant decision also provided guidelines for identifying quasicommercial associations that states may regulate with desegregation
laws. These guidelines clarified when a club is truly private and enjoys
a constitutional right to discriminate when choosing its members. The
Roberts and Rotary Courts assessed the club members' relationships;
they ranged from the most intimate to the most attenuated. 5 The
Roberts and Rotary Courts considered the size, purpose, and selectivity of the clubs to determine where the members' relationships fell
on this spectrum. But the instant decision will help states objectively
define public accommodations. First, the instant Court specified that
clubs with over 400 members lacked the relative smallness discussed
in Roberts. 7 Second, the Court reasoned that clubs of this size regularly providing meal service and receiving payment from nonmembers

79. See id. at 2230.
80. See Comment, Roberts v. United States Jaycees and the Affirmation of State Authority
to Prohibit Sex Discriminationin Public Accommodations: Distinguishing"Private"Activity,
the Exercise of Expressive Association, and the Practiceof Discrimination,38 RUTGERS L.
REv. 341, 341 (1986) (citing United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 769 (D. Minn.
1982)).
81. Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
82. See James, supra note 1, at 253.
83. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
84. See id.
85. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1946; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
86. 107 S. Ct. at 1946-47; 468 U.S. at 620-21.
87. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
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m
lack the purpose and selectivity of private clubs. Third, the Court
found that in these circumstances, the state's interest in eliminating
9
discrimination outweighs the club's desire to control its membership.
Moreover, the instant Court narrowly applied the doctrines of intimate and expressive association; 9° these doctrines cannot shield invidious discrimination.9 1 The instant Court refused to protect a social
club as an intimate association merely because it houses some intimate
associationY2 The Court recognized that many places of public accommodation, such as restaurants, could make the same claim.93 For a
club to be constitutionally protected as an intimate association, its
members must share a personal bond similar to a family relationship.94
The instant Court refused to extend this protection to the impersonal
relationships shared by social club members.m
The instant Court also emphasized, as did Roberts, that the right
of expressive association is not absolute.9 To successfully claim protection under this doctrine, a club must prove that it organized for specific
expressive purposes.9 7 Such a club must also show that forced desegregation would prevent it from advancing its desired viewpoints.98 To
claim expressive association, the club must be unable to advocate its
viewpoints unless it limits its membership based on factors such as
gender or race.9 Here, the Court's analysis echoes the concerns it
expressed in NAACP. 10 0 In effect, the instant Court prevented clubs

88. Id.
89. Id. at 2230.
90. See supra notes 14, 15 & 34 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. at 2233-34.
93. Id.
94. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). A troublesome aspect
of the instant decision is that the Court failed to state how a club within the Law's reach would
prove that it was a truly intimate association. The Court did specify how a club could prove
that it organized for specific expressive purposes. See infranotes 97-99 and accompanying text.
95. 108 S. Ct. at 2233-34. See generally Burns, The Exclusion of Women from Influential
MeW's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of FullEquality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
321, 343-47 (1983) (discussing the right to privacy as applied to the exclusion of women from
genteel men's clubs).
96. 108 S. Ct. at 2234. See also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 ("Infringements on that right
may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.").
97. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. at 2234.
98. Id. The Court added that the record before it contained "no specific evidence on the
characteristics of any club covered by the Law." Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
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subject to Law 63 from tacitly qualifying membership by using immutable characteristics in place of legitimate membership criteria.101
The Court noted that many types of public accommodations encourage constitutionally protected associational activity.10° Intimate and
expressive associations form and flourish in clubs that fit the definition
of "public accommodation." Yet, the instant Court realized that states
could effect equal opportunity in the business world only if they can
desegregate public accommodations that provide the setting for some
associational activity.
According to the instant Court, states may infringe on the right
to associate and exclude only when a club's quasi-commercial function
subordinates its associational activity. °3 The specific criteria of Law
63 prevent the state from infringing on the associational rights of
clubs falling between the private and commercial poles. 1° The instant
decision permits a social club to discriminate if the club falls outside
the Gestalt of "public accommodation." A social club must meet all
three of the criteria of Law 63 before the state can force the club to
desegregate its membership.105 For example, a club with over 400
members that regularly includes only members in its activities is outside the reach of Law 63.106
To justify some infringement on associational freedoms, the Court
persuasively and pragmatically analyzed the policy underlying state
anti-discrimination laws. The Court reviewed the legislative intent
behind Law 63 - providing equal opportunity for professional advancement. 1°0 The instant Court then examined the constitutional doctrines
of intimate and expressive association and the specific, protected individual liberties. 108 States would acquiesce to subtle yet severe discrimi-

101. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234. "[T]he law merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in
place of... more legitimate criteria for determining membership." Id.
102. Id. at 2233-34. The Court failed to discuss the camaraderie that separatism fosters.
But the Court's overall analysis suggests that club members' separatism would be constitutionally
protected only if this camaraderie was the primary focus of the club members' relationship.
103. See id.
104. See generally Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 114-118
(1986) (discussing the unsatisfactory nature of the Roberts spectrum analysis in offering guidelines
regarding such grey area clubs).
105. See supra note 5.
106. The Law in no way implicates the individual's freedom to associate and exclude in

small social dubs, in clubs with primary expressive purposes, or in private settings such as the
home.
107.
108.

New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
See id. at 2233-34.
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nation if the Court extended these constitutional protections to discriminatory social clubs. 1 9 Because the Court looked beyond the intimacy
that club members purport to share, it recognized that some clubs'
discriminatory membership selection practices served no constitutionally protected purpose. 110
The law must protect both the individual liberty to associate and
exclude and the state interest in eradicating invidious discrimination
in the business world,,' In the realm of intimate and expressive relationships, the instant Court affirmed the rights of citizens to be free
from governmental intrusion."2 But in the quasi-commercial realm,
the Court affirmed the state interest in providing equal access to
professional advancement." 3 The Court recognized that professional
advancement depends in part on membership in social clubs of choice." 4
By defining "public accommodation" to include some social clubs, the
instant Court opened the door for states to enact meaningful anti-discrimination laws.
Alexa Roberta Pavchinski

109.

See generally Burns, supra note 95, at 322-23 (discussing "subtle, sophisticated, and

invidious" discrimination in prestigious institutions).
110.

See generally id. at 347 ("If a public aspect of [a] club can be shown,... legal attacks

are possible.").
111.
112.

See New York State Club Assn, 108 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
See id.

113. See id.
114.

See Burns, supra note 95, at 322.
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